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Abstract 
 
 Extending data reported by Hafez in 2007,  we compiled a database of 1,779 suicide 
bombers who attempted or completed attacks in Iraq from 2003 through 2010.  From 2003 
through 2006, monthly totals of suicide bombers show a pattern different from the pattern of 
non-suicide attacks by insurgents, but from 2007 through 2010 the two patterns were similar.  
This biphasic pattern tests the common assumption that suicide attacks require separate analysis: 
it appears that suicide attacks sometimes vary along with the general volume of insurgent 
violence.  We also show that only 13 percent of suicide bombers targeted coalition forces and 
international civilians, primarily during the early years of the conflict, whereas 83 percent of 
suicide bombers targeted Iraqis (civilians, the Awakening Movement, Iraqi Security Forces and 
government entities) in attacks that extended throughout the duration of the insurgency. These 
results challenge the idea that suicide attacks are primarily a nationalist response to foreign 
occupation and caution that ‘smart bombs’ may be more often sent against soft targets than hard 
targets.  More generally, we argue that suicide attacks must be disaggregated by target in order to 
understand these attacks as the expression of different insurgent priorities at different times.   
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Mass media and the international community have given considerable attention to suicide 
bombers and their horrifying acts of violence.  As a tactic, suicide bombing offers some obvious 
advantages: a lethal weapon strapped to a conscious individual can, in principle, guarantee that 
the attack will be “carried out at the most appropriate time and place with regard to the terrorists’ 
objectives.”1  Public attention and terrorism research thus tend to focus on the individual: the 
bomber’s gender, marital status, age, education, socioeconomic background, and ideology.  This 
individualist focus has been associated with psychological and sociological research to 
illuminate motivation and recruitment of suicide bombers.2   
It is important to note, however, that most suicide bombers operate as part of, in the name of, 
or are inspired by a group that has made a strategic decision to adopt suicide bombing as part of 
an armed campaign.3  Here we are interested in learning more about the motives of those who 
arm and deliver suicide bombers, rather than the motives of the bombers themselves.  We aim to 
explain the motives for using suicide bombers by examining trends over time in the targets 
against which suicide bombers are deployed.  The context for our study is the insurgency in Iraq, 
where suicide bombings began shortly after the arrival of the Multi National Forces-Iraq (MNF-
I) in 2003.   
Hafez tallied 514 suicide attacks in Iraq between March 2003 and August 2006. 4  By 2010 
Iraq had become the primary theater of operational and strategic development for this tactic.  
Rather than reading insurgent statements and propaganda in order to discern the goals of suicide 
bombing, we analyzed a monthly database of 1,779 attempted and completed suicide attacks in 
Iraq from 2003 through 2010 to identify who was targeted in these attacks.  Patterns of targeting 
and changes in targeting can be identified; these patterns can be distinguished from patterns of 
non-suicide insurgent attacks, and, when examined in the context of major political events in 
Iraq, these patterns can tell us something about insurgent priorities and motivations in using 
suicide attacks.  Before embarking on our analysis, it is useful to review briefly some current 
views of why and when insurgents and terrorists turn to suicide bombing as a tactic. 
 
Why and when do insurgents use suicide bombing?   
Suicide attacks have been used historically by many different groups including religious sects, 
anarchists, secular nationalists, insurgents, and even national armies.  Political scientists, 
psychologists, and anthropologists have developed a variety of possible explanations for why a 
group would use suicide attacks to advance their cause.  To put the suicide campaign in Iraq 
within a larger historical and academic context, we examine briefly the work of four scholars—
Bruce Hoffman, Robert Pape, Mia Bloom, and Mohammed Hafez—all of whom have studied the 
use of suicide bombing.   
In a 2003 essay, Hoffman popularized a characterization of suicide bombers as “smart 
bombs.”5  
“The fundamental characteristics of suicide bombing, and its strong attraction for the terrorist 
organizations behind it, are universal: Suicide bombings are inexpensive and effective. They are less 
complicated and compromising than other kinds of terrorist operations. They guarantee media 
coverage. The suicide terrorist is the ultimate smart bomb. Perhaps most important, coldly efficient 
bombings tear at the fabric of trust that holds societies together. All these reasons doubtless account for 
the spread of suicide terrorism from the Middle East to Sri Lanka and Turkey, Argentina and 
Chechnya, Russia and Algeria—and to the United States.”6 
 
It must be observed that the utilitarian logic of “inexpensive and effective” cannot explain why 
many terrorists do not use suicide attacks.  But for those who do, the “smart bomb” metaphor 
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implies that this tactic should be used against the most difficult and hardened targets, as Western 
armies use guided munitions and drones.   
Pape’s study of suicide bombers offers similar ideas.  First, Pape agrees with Hoffman 
that suicide attacks are used because they work: they allow even a weak group to cause 
immediate damage and threaten more damage in the future.  Second, and more specifically, Pape 
sees suicide attacks as “primarily an extreme national liberation strategy used against foreign 
occupiers with a democratic political system.”7   Here we understand Pape to be suggesting, as 
Hoffman’s smart bomb metaphor suggests, that suicide attacks in Iraq will primarily target 
foreigners, both because they are foreign and because they are better defended.  We test this idea 
in our study by comparing attacks on coalition forces and international civilians with attacks on 
Iraqi nationals.     
Bloom’s “outbidding theory” emphasizes the prevalence of suicide attacks in conflicts 
with multiple insurgent groups.8  In the case of Iraq, outbidding theory suggests that insurgents 
use suicide bombing to show that they are more committed to the cause of liberation from 
occupying forces than other groups, because they are willing to make greater sacrifices for the 
struggle.  Bloom’s argument depends on a certain amount of public support for martyrdom 
operations, and also requires groups to claim responsibility for suicide attacks.  In our study, we 
examine this prediction by analyzing how many suicide bombers are claimed and what groups 
are making the claims.   
As already noted, Hafez focused specifically on suicide bombings in Iraq, and he argues 
that these attacks are designed to collapse the emerging democratic political structure and spark 
sectarian violence.  The chaos which ensues is the only way the two weakest actors in the Iraqi 
insurgency, the Ba’athists and Al Qaeda inspired transnational insurgents, can compete for 
influence in Iraq.  Hafez supports this interpretation with data on suicide attacks between 2003 
and August 2006, which show that Al Qaeda inspired groups and Ba’athists were first and 
second in claiming suicide attacks.  In our study of suicide bombers we test the generalizability 
of this pattern in examining claimed attacks across additional years, 2007-2010.   
 
The present study 
We developed a new database of suicide bombers in Iraq, covering the years 2003-2010.  Our 
database differed from that developed by Hafez in two ways. 9  First, he counted suicide bombing 
incidents whereas we counted suicide bombers.  Second, his database covered the years 2003-
2008, whereas our data covered the years 2003-2010.10  As described below, we begin by 
showing convergence between our data and Hafez’s data for the overlap years 2003-2006.  Then 
we use our 2003-2010 data to compare trends in suicide bombing with trends in non-suicide 
attacks over the same time span.  Finally, we compare trends in targeting against foreigners in 
Iraq with trends in targeting against Iraqis, including security forces, government entities, and 
civilians.  Our discussion uses the patterns in our data to reflect on some of the ideas about 
suicide bombing that we have described above.    
In addition, we examine the implicit assumption of previous research on suicide 
bombing, that this tactic requires separate analysis.  Hoffman, Pape, Bloom, and Hafez all focus 
on suicide bombing in a way that implies that this tactic is not like roadside bombs, shootings, 
arson, and kidnapping.  We test this implication by comparing trends in suicide attacks in Iraq 
with trends in non-suicide attacks over the same period. 
    
Methods 
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Studies of suicide bombings that derive their statistics solely from media accounts can be 
inaccurate and may emphasize casualties rather than bombing targets.  Attacks that are 
particularly casualty-heavy, hit high-profile targets, are carried out by women, or claimed by Al 
Qaeda Iraq or its affiliates11 are likely to receive a disproportionate amount of media attention.  
In contrast, suicide car bombs detonated at security checkpoints, killing one or two Iraqi soldiers, 
can easily be lost in a day’s tally of roadside bombs, RPG attacks, fire fights, and kidnappings.  
To move beyond a media-biased perspective of suicide attacks in Iraq, we aimed to study all 
recorded suicide bomb attacks in Iraq from 2003 through 2010, including failed or foiled 
bombers.   
Thus, our database compiled suicide bombers represented in three existing databases detailed 
below, with attention to the details of each incident to ensure that each individual suicide bomber 
was entered in our database only once.  Details of each incident were also used to code the likely 
target for each suicide bomber.   
For incidents in which multiple bombers converged on a single target, an entry in the 
database was made for each individual bomber who was involved.  An attack which used three 
suicide bombers, therefore, was entered into the database three times, detailing the date, location, 
and target for each bomber.  One coordinated attack on the Green Zone, for example, might 
involve one suicide bomber detonating at an entry checkpoint, and two who detonated after a 
crowd had formed around the first attack site.   
It is important to note that our database counts bombers whereas the databases from which 
we took our cases counted incidents.  There are more bombers than incidents to the extent that 
some of these incidents involved multiple bombers.  Thus, monthly totals represented in our 
study tally each suicide bomber who detonated, or attempted to detonate, explosives in 
circumstances indicating that the bomber expected to die in the attack.   
 
Sources of Data 
Our database included both suicide IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) and suicide VBIEDs 
(Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices) from three terrorist incident databases: the 
National Counterterrorism Center’s Worldwide Incidents Tracking System, the RAND 
Corporation’s Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents, and the University of Maryland’s 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) Global 
Terrorism Database.  All three databases had details that allowed us to identify the number of 
individual bombers involved in each attack.  Our combined database of bombers was completed 
in April 2011. 
The National Counterterrorism Center’s Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS 
NextGen) compiles “incidents in which subnational or clandestine groups or individuals 
deliberately or recklessly attacked civilians or noncombatants (including military personnel and 
assets outside war zones and war-like settings).”  WITS NextGen defines these attacks by 
“subnational or clandestine groups” as “terrorist attacks,” and therefore in Figure 1, where we 
use WITS NextGen’s tally of non-suicide attacks, we refer to them as the database does, i.e. as 
terrorist attacks. The database includes only attacks which have been initiated and executed, and 
in most cases the attacker must have died in the attack for it to be considered a suicide.12   
WITS NextGen’s report of attacks in Iraq with Suicide=Yes and Event Type=Bombing 
generated 1,362 incidents from January 14, 2004 to the end of December, 2010.  For comparison, 
from January 1, 2004 to the end of December, 2010, WITS NextGen recorded 24,127 non-
suicide attacks in Iraq, including non-suicide bombings.  Because this database is particularly 
  
 
6 
thorough in scope and consistent in its reporting of terrorist incidents, it was the obvious choice 
as our source for data concerning non-suicide attacks.    
The RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI) defines terrorism based 
upon “the nature of the act, not by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of the cause” and 
uses Bruce Hoffman’s definition of terrorist acts “as the deliberate creation and exploitation of 
fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.”  Unlike WITS 
NextGen, RDWTI includes interrupted attacks in its database, so long as the attacker 
demonstrated “movement toward the target.” 13 Using an incident subset which included Iraq and 
Suicide Attack=true, incident type = bombing, RDWTI generated 954 attacks from February 26, 
2003 to the end of 2008, with unexplained data omissions in May 2007 and January 2008.  For 
comparison, from February 2003 through 2008, RDWTI recorded 884 non-suicide terrorist 
attacks, including non-suicide bombings, again with the omission of May 2007 and January 
2008.  Note that RDWTI contains many fewer non-suicide attacks than WITSNextGen.       
START’s Global Terrorism Database (GTD) included several months where total incidents 
as well as suicide bombing incidents in Iraq were inexplicably and impossibly few in number.  
The pattern of overall attacks and suicide attacks deviated greatly from the patterns seen in the 
other two terrorism databases.  Given this eccentricity, START’s GTD catalogue of suicide 
bombing incidents was used only during the last review of our database, and suicide incidents 
appearing only in the START database were included in our database only after additional 
research for verification. 
Overall, our completed database showed that 6 percent of suicide bombers carried out attacks 
as part of a coordinated effort, with two to five individual suicide bombers used to attack one 
target.  We believe that tracking bombers, rather than attacks, is a more direct and valid 
indication of the motives and priorities of those who send suicide bombers to their targets.  An 
attack that uses five suicide bombers to attack a single target indicates that insurgents determined 
the target’s worth to be greater than that of a target warranting one bomber.  Similarly, tracking 
bombers is a better indication of motives and priorities than tracking casualties, which can be 
determined more by chance than by the intent of those dispatching the bombers.  
 
Target Coding 
Our analysis of suicide bombing in Iraq does not specifically address the number of casualties, as 
this information is often impossible to record definitively.  When available, we did record 
whether or not a bombing attack was claimed by one or more militant groups.  Most important, 
our database identified the intended target of each suicide attack and available details of the 
attack circumstances.  This information is of particular significance in suicide attacks, as the 
bomber can more often ensure that the intended target objective will be hit. In contrast, the 
intended targets of buried roadside IEDs and booby trapped explosives are more uncertain.   
We coded each bombing as targeting one of the following: Iraqi Civilian; Iraqi 
Government entity; Iraqi Security Forces; Coalition Forces; International Civilian entity; or 
Awakening Movement entity.  Attacks targeting international Coalition Forces and International 
Civilian entities were combined because of their similar status as “high risk” targets, likely better 
defended than Iraqi targets, and because attacks on foreigners can have different political 
meaning than attacks on Iraqis. Also, we combined attacks targeting Iraqi Civilians, Iraqi 
Government entities, and Iraqi Security Forces, but we disaggregated these target subcategories 
in an additional analysis.  The Awakening Movement began in late 2006, and attacks targeting 
this group begin only after this date.   
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For 67 suicide bombers, their intended target was either too ambiguous to determine, or 
in rare cases, did not fall into any of our target sets (e.g. attacks on infrastructure).  Most of these 
unknown-target bombers appeared in 2007, when violence was widespread and reporting on 
attacks did not provide as much detail as attacks which occurred during calmer periods of the 
insurgency.  As the number of unknown-target bombers was negligible in relation to the total 
number of bombers (67 of 1,779), we report percentages of suicide bombers associated with 
different targets based on the total number of suicide bombers (1,779).  
 
Results  
Our results are organized in relation to three questions.  Is the pattern of suicide bombers in our 
database similar to the pattern of suicide incidents reported by Hafez?  Is the pattern of suicide 
bombers different from the pattern of other kinds of insurgent attacks?  What are the patterns of 
suicide bombers against International targets and various Iraqi targets? 
 Results show in general that, during the insurgency, there were notable shifts in the 
targets of suicide bombings, and that some sense can be made of the timing of these shifts.  
Although it may appear that suicide violence was a sporadic and desperate attempt to sow 
discord in Iraq, a closer examination reveals different time-patterns of suicide bombers for 
different target sets.   
 
Suicide bombers vs. Hafez suicide incidents 
To test the reliability of our data, we compared our monthly totals of bombers with monthly 
totals of suicide incidents (not bombers or individual bombings) collected by Mohammed Hafez 
and published in his book, Suicide Bombers in Iraq (2007).  His published data, which Hafez 
generously provided in detail to the authors for this study, included 514 incidents from March 
22, 2003 to August 18, 2006.  Over these same 42 months, our database included 792 suicide 
bombers.14  The Pearson correlation of incidents and bombers was .94 (n=42), indicating a very 
high similarity in the pattern of suicide incidents and the pattern of suicide bombers for the 
months of overlap between Hafez’s data and our own.  Our data show monthly totals greater than 
those Hafez reported, owing largely to the fact that we counted individual bombers rather than 
incidents.       
Monthly totals for our data are shown in Figure 1. Descriptively, our data agree with 
Hafez’s data in showing a broad peak between January and September 2005. 15  In addition, our 
data show a second peak between January and September 2007.  In short, our data from 2003 to 
2006 show the same pattern as Hafez’s data from these years, and our data from years not 
covered by Hafez show an additional peak in 2007.  The convergence of the two sets of data 
during the overlap period is evidence of the reliability of both. 
   
Figure 1 about here 
 
 
 
Suicide bombers vs. non-suicide attacks 
From 2003 through 2010, our database shows a total of 1,779 suicide bombers.  In order to test 
the distinctiveness of suicide bombing as an insurgent tactic, we compared the pattern of suicide 
bombers per month with the pattern of total insurgent attacks per month.  Because the database 
provided by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) contained the most complete 
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collection of insurgent attacks in Iraq, data from NCTC WITS NextGen were used to make this 
comparison.  Consistent WITS data for insurgent attacks are not available for 2003 but begin in 
2004. 
Comparison of insurgent attacks with suicide bombers revealed a two-phase relationship 
(see Figure 1).  Monthly suicide bombers from 2004 through 2006 show a Pearson Correlation 
with monthly insurgent attacks of only .36 over 36 months.  But the same correlation from 2007 
through 2010 is .86 over 48 months.  (The correlation of total attacks and suicide bombers over 
the total time period studied, 2003 through 2010, is .57.)  Descriptively, it is clear that the 
relationship between total insurgent attacks and suicide bombers was weak at the beginning of 
the insurgency, but grew stronger beginning in 2007.   
This bi-phasic relation, first weak then strong, indicates that suicide bombing need not be 
closely associated with the total volume of insurgent attacks.  The weak relation of suicide 
attacks and non-suicide attacks between 2004 and 2006 indicates instead that suicide bombing 
can at least sometimes reflect different dynamics than other forms of violence in the same 
insurgency.  Previous research on suicide bombings has generally assumed their distinctive 
quality and thus assumed that separate analysis of suicide bombing is warranted. Our results 
provide empirical support for this assumption for the period 2004-2006, but results for the period 
2007-2010 challenge the claim.  In short, our results indicate that sometimes suicide bombing is 
only weakly related to other forms of insurgent attack and must be understood in terms of its 
own dynamics, and sometimes is so strongly related to other forms of attack that separate 
analysis of suicide bombing may be unnecessary.   
It would indeed be interesting to analyze non-suicide insurgent attacks by target, and to 
track change in targeting over time as we have done with suicide bombers.  Unfortunately, the 
24,127 non-suicide attacks recorded in WITS NextGen between January 2004 and December 
2010 do not always provide enough detail to code the intended target.  In any case, analysis of 
more than 24 thousand non-suicide attacks is beyond the resources and scope of our study.     
 
Suicide bombers claimed vs. unclaimed 
 Information about claiming of suicide bombers was obtained from the three databases and from 
other news reports of the incidents.  Claims are likely incomplete, as the databases may not have 
picked up on groups claiming responsibility on obscure websites or in a more localized manner 
such as leaflets or word of mouth.  Still, it is worth noting that the 395 bombers in claimed 
attacks made up only 22 percent of suicide bombers from 2003 to 2010. 16 
 Approximately 88 percent (349/395) of claimed bombers were claimed by Al Qaeda and 
affiliated groups.  Groups whose attacks were coded as an “Al Qaeda” claim include, in addition 
to Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI),  Tawhid wa al-Jihad, al Bara bin Malek Brigades (Al Qaeda’s 
specialized suicide bombing cell), the Mujahideen Shura Council, and the Islamic State of 
Iraq. It is possible that the databases we drew on and news accounts more generally tend to over-
report Al Qaeda claims by assuming, when in doubt, that suicide attacks are the work of Al 
Qaeda.  Nevertheless it is clear that an overwhelming majority of claimed attacks were 
associated with AQI or Al Qaeda-related groups.   
The frequency of claimed attacks reveals a two-peaked shape similar to that of total 
suicide bombers per month, but with slight deviations.  The first peak of claimed attacks started 
in early 2005, with 39 percent (156/395) of claimed attacks occurring in that year.  The second 
peak began in March 2007, but this high level of claimed attacks lasted only four months: after 
July 2007 the number of claimed attacks per month remained under ten through 2010.  The 
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earlier peak reached a maximum of 32 claimed bombers in June 2005, whereas the maximum of 
the second peak was 17 claimed bombers in March 2007.   
This pattern suggests that insurgent groups were more motivated to assert their 
responsibility for attacks early in the insurgency, presumably while groups were competing for 
post-invasion status among a public more willing to cooperate with insurgent groups.  The 
second peak in 2007, following the U.S. surge and a shift in public support away from Al Qaeda, 
may indicate motivation to reclaim public status, to intimidate new enemies, or both.  The 
decline in claimed attacks after mid-2007 suggests a public turn against suicide bombing.     
 
Suicide Bombers Target Set 1: Coalition Forces and International Civilians 
The defining characteristic of this first target set is that the targets are foreigners. Attacks against 
foreigners are distinguished from attacks against other targets because attacks against a perceived 
occupier will likely be viewed by Iraqis as importantly different from attacks against other Iraqis.  
Foreign targets include members of the coalition forces in Iraq at their bases, during their foot 
patrols, and at coalition-manned checkpoints.  In addition to attacks against United States forces, 
attacks also targeted non-U.S. coalition members including Polish and Italian military forces.   
This first target set also includes international civilians including tourists, diplomats, 
journalists, foreign contractors, embassy staff, employees of non-profit organizations, and hotels 
frequented by foreigners.  Attacks in and at the entrance of the Green Zone (now known as the 
International Zone) were included in this set, as it served as a base of operations for coalition 
forces, and housed numerous embassies and private contractors.  Attacks against patrols 
conducted jointly by Iraqi Security Forces and U.S. military forces are included in Target Set 1 
because, compared with attacks on Iraqi Security Forces operating alone, attacks on joint patrols 
are higher risk and higher profile to the extent that U.S. forces are targeted in the operation.        
Target Set 1 accounted for 12.9 percent of total suicide targets (229 out of 1,779).  
Although suicide attacks against Coalition Forces began in the spring of 2003, suicide bombers 
against Coalition targets reached new highs in April, May, and June of 2005.  Thus bombers 
attacking Target Set 1 contributed to the peak in total suicide bombers in 2005 (see Figure 1).  
Bombers against Set 1 targets remained high through October 2005, as coalition forces carried 
out major counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Baghdad and al-Anbar provinces, with many 
suicide attacks occurring in these two areas.  It is important to note that, after October 2005, 
bombers per month against Target Set 1 became and remained very low, as suicide bombers 
shifted to targeting almost exclusively Iraqis.  Even after the 2007 U.S. troop surge, when more 
than 20,000 additional U.S. soldiers were deployed to Iraq, suicide bombers did not increase 
against Coalition targets.    
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Suicide Bombers Target Set 2: Awakening Movement 
The second set of targets is comprised of participants in the Awakening (Sahwa) movement 
which began in Iraq in late 2006.  Included in Target Set 2 are attacks on Sunni tribal leaders 
who cooperated with coalition forces and the Iraqi government as part of Sahwa Councils, and 
their government-backed militias, the Sons of Iraq.  Targets also included the houses of Sahwa 
Council tribal leaders, Sahwa Council meetings, and checkpoints manned by members of the 
Sons of Iraq.  Although relatively few in number (116/1,779), making up only 6.5 percent of 
total suicide bombers, these attacks against Iraqi Sunnis deserve separate consideration.   
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Tribal leaders from twenty-five Sunni al-Anbar tribes joined forces in September 2006 to 
fight transnational insurgents in their province in a clear rejection of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and 
its affiliates.  Working to reverse the mentality which had developed during the civil conflict, 
these armed Sunni groups contested AQI’s claim to be the only Sunni defense against Iraqi 
Shi’ites.17   
Awakening members aided in providing tips to the coalition and Iraqi Security Forces of 
the whereabouts of transnational insurgents, the locations of weapons caches, and they manned 
checkpoints. Most important, Awakening forces provided neighborhood security.  Because the 
Sons of Iraq were made up of local Sunni volunteers, community trust in local security services 
was at least partially restored in Sunni dominated areas. 
The alliance of Awakening leaders included some from areas that formerly harbored AQI 
actors, and the Sons of Iraq included many former Sunni insurgents.18 The Awakening 
Movement severely weakened AQI because they “deprived the terrorist organization of its most 
secure base in Iraq.”19  In 2007, the model of tribal cooperation was brought to other 
transnational Sunni insurgent strongholds such as Diyala, Tikrit, and southern Baghdad, and AQI 
leaders are cited as reporting that between mid-2007 to 2008, their numbers had dropped by over 
70 percent, from 12,000 to 3,500.20     
As Sunni armed groups and tribal communities turned against Al Qaeda in Iraq and its 
affiliates, a critical shift in suicide bombing occurred.  Attacks targeting the Awakening 
Movement were politically important as they marked the first time during the insurgency that 
Sunni communities were targeted by suicide bombers. Suicide attacks against Awakening targets 
increased significantly in early 2007 (Figure 2) and peaked in early 2008; these attacks especially 
targeted  Sunni sheikhs at their homes, their convoys, and meetings; over one hundred 
Awakening Council leaders were killed by suicide bombings and ambushes.21     
Targeting of Awakening Movement members declined in September 2008 and remained 
at a low level through the end of our study period in December 2010.  As amplified in our 
Discussion, it seems likely that this decline represents a failure of capacity, as AQI and its 
affiliates lost their cover in Sunni communities and were repressed by Awakening forces.   
 
Suicide Bombers Target Set 3: Iraqi security forces, civilians, and government  
Iraqi Security Forces include members of the Iraqi police or military formed after post-invasion 
de-Ba’athification.  These forces were targeted in attacks on Iraqi military bases, foot patrols, 
police stations, as first responders to attacks, in lines and buses filled with recruits, as civilians 
queued to apply for jobs with the police or military, and at checkpoints where the suicide bomber 
detonated his/her explosives with no clear intent to target another entity.   
Iraqi Government entities include civilian groups and individuals working or cooperating 
with the newly formed Iraqi governing body; these include political parties, politicians and their 
convoys, government buildings, and polling stations.  Iraqi Civilian targets include suicide 
bombers detonating in crowded marketplaces, schools, in mosques, or on private property.  
Unlike Awakening targets, who are known to be Sunni tribesmen, the third set of targets 
are not easily characterized in terms of ethnicity.   Security Force and Government targets are 
probably mostly Shi’a, but include also some Sunni Arabs and Kurds.  Civilian targets include an 
unknown mix of Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurds.   
Target Set 3 was by far the most frequent target of suicide attacks, drawing 76.8 percent 
(1,366/1,779) of all suicide bombers in the period studied.  Given that Target Set 3 drew three 
quarters of all suicide bombers in the study period, one would expect that the pattern of bombers 
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against this target set would mirror the pattern of all suicide bombers.  Indeed the Pearson 
Correlation between monthly suicide bombers of Iraqi Targets and monthly total suicide 
bombers was .99 over the 96 months of our study.  Thus Figure 2 does not separately graph total 
suicide bombers per month (already represented in Figure 1).   
If we consider that Awakening targets were also Iraqi, the predominance of suicide 
attacks against Iraqi targets is even more striking:  116 plus 1,366, or 1,482 bombers targeted 
Iraqis, representing 83 percent of suicide bomber in the study period.  From the U.S. it is perhaps 
not easy to grasp that four fifths of all suicide bombers in Iraq were targeting Iraqis. This result is 
important, as it shows that the fear, outrage, and destruction produced by suicide bombers were 
overwhelmingly intended for Iraqis themselves, not foreign forces.  
Target Set 3 was analyzed further by separating this set into component target categories:  
Iraqi Security Forces (792 or 44.5 percent of bombers), Iraqi Civilians (375 or 21.1 percent of 
bombers), and Iraqi Government entities (199 or 11.2 percent of bombers).  Here, it is interesting 
to note that bombers targeted security forces twice as often as civilians, and civilians twice as 
often as government entities.   
Patterns of suicide bombers for these three Iraqi targets were only moderately correlated.  
Across 96 months from 2003 through 2010, bombers against Security Forces correlated .67 with 
bombers against Iraqi Civilians and .50 with bombers against Iraqi Government.  Bombers 
against Iraqi Civilians correlated .37 with bombers against Iraqi Government.  (Similar 
correlations, available from the authors, are obtained when the correlations are calculated 
separately for 2003-2006 and 2007-2010).  Descriptively, Figure 3 shows that bombers targeting 
Iraqi Security Forces, and bombers targeting Iraqi Civilians, both show the two peaks (2005 and 
2007) already noted in Figures 1 and 2.  Bombers targeting Iraqi Government entities, however, 
show only a single peak early in January 2005.   
It would be useful to further divide civilian targets into Sunni versus Shi’ite civilian 
targets (also Kurdish civilian targets) but our data too seldom provided explicit identification of 
the ethnicity of bombing targets.  Nevertheless, a cursory examination of the assumed ethnicity 
of civilian targets shows that attacks on civilians starting in the early years of the insurgency may 
have intentionally targeted Shi’ite neighborhoods and mosques, and shifted to including Sunni 
targets only during the Awakening.   
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
Discussion 
Our study followed Hafez in focusing specifically on suicide bombers in Iraq. 22  Our database 
covered the years 2003 through 2010, and the monthly variation of bombers in our database 
closely matched the monthly variation of suicide attack incidents in Hafez’s database for the 
overlap years of 2003-2006.  The close correlation of our data with Hafez’s data gives 
confidence in the reliability of our data.  We turn now to the questions raised in the Introduction. 
 
Suicide bombers vs. non-suicide attacks 
Our results indicate that there can be different dynamics for suicide bomber attacks and non-
suicide attacks, as suicide bombers per month showed a biphasic relation with total insurgent 
attacks per month.  From 2004 to 2006, the correlation was only .36, but from 2007 to 2010 the 
correlation was .86.  As seen in Figure 1, the gradual increase in violence during the insurgency 
peaked in 2007, a monotonic pattern contrasting with two separate peaks of suicide bombing 
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activity in 2005 and 2007.  The peak in suicide bombers in 2005 confirms results presented by 
Hafez, who showed how the steady increase in insurgent attacks from 2003 to 2006 differed 
from the peaking of suicide attacks in 2005. 23  The different trends for suicide and non-suicide 
attacks become even more pronounced when compared over the longer period of 2003-2010.   
Why did suicide bombing follow a different pattern from non-suicide insurgent violence 
early in the insurgency, but show much the same pattern of decline after 2007?  Our 
interpretation is that, early in the insurgency, Al Qaeda-inspired groups in Iraq were competing 
with other militant groups in opposing coalition forces.  AQI used suicide bombings to intensify 
a “system collapse” strategy as detailed by Hafez,24 whereas larger militant groups hoped to 
control the new system being built by coalition forces.  AQI used suicide bombers out of 
desperation and weakness, while Sunni ex-military and Shi’ite militants with support from Iran 
felt strong enough with conventional weapons. Thus, in the early part of the insurgency, AQI and 
perhaps small groups of Ba’athists were using suicide bombings, but most of the violence was 
produced by stronger players.  The pattern of suicide attacks did not match the pattern of overall 
violence because suicide and non-suicide attacks came generally from different sources.   
But why did suicide attacks and total insurgent attacks decline in parallel after 2007? 
Two major events occurred at this point in the insurgency.  First, in late 2006, the Awakening 
Movement began to take hold. Second, in January 2007, the U.S. announced “The New Way 
Forward,” a surge of over 20,000 American troops in Iraq, along with a new COIN approach that 
focused on population security and required troops to transition from working from large 
forward operating bases to living and working among Iraqis in small security outposts and joint 
security stations.   
It was a “synergistic interaction” between these two initiatives that led to greater overall 
stability in Iraq.25  Earlier attempts by Sunni tribal leaders to counter the influence of AQI in 
their communities by arranging cease-fire agreements with coalition troops were unsuccessful in 
providing sufficient protection for those tribal leaders who cooperated in these negotiations.  
More troops deployed more locally after the surge not only gave the Awakening movement 
members the support and protection they needed to stand-up to AQI, but also opened a key 
partnership in intelligence-sharing and joint operations with the Sons of Iraq. 
This latter element undoubtedly contributed to the decrease in suicide bombers from 
2007-2010.  Suicide bombing operations require more than a set of explosives and a willing 
transporter.  Operations require detailed planning, expert bomb makers, and other support 
personnel to procure materials and transport.  Given the scale of suicide operations in Iraq, local 
protection for support personnel and their hideaways was critical to success.  The Sons of Iraq 
who shared information about the whereabouts of these cells with coalition troops, and the 
greater capacity of joint patrols to find and clear these cells, ultimately led to a decrease in 
suicide bombing due to a decrease in capacity and manpower to plan, create, and execute suicide 
attacks.    
Our results show a pattern of attacks on Awakening targets that underlines the 
importance of the Awakening Movement for the general decline of insurgent violence during and 
after 2007.  Although only about 8 percent of all suicide bombers between 2003 and 2010 were 
against Awakening targets, these targets are concentrated in time:  beginning in 2007, peaking in 
2008, and declining to very low levels after 2008.  This was the period of the synergistic 
combination of new troops, new tactics, and U.S. contracts hiring Sunni militants.  The key 
observation is that suicide bombing against Awakening targets peaked at this time, whereas 
suicide bombing against Coalition and International targets did not increase at all.  The 
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implication is that those sending the suicide bombers saw the Awakening as a more proximate 
threat than coalition forces.  
In short, suicide bombing declined from 2007 in parallel with decline in non-suicide 
attacks because both declines came from the same synergistic combination—more troops and 
more local troop deployment combined with Awakening contracts in which the U.S. paid Sunnis 
to shift from insurgency to local security as Sons of Iraq.  This situation contrasts with the 
situation of 2003-2006, when suicide bombers were only a small part of insurgent violence 
perpetrated by Sunni and Shi’ite militants who were strong enough not to need suicide bombers. 
This interpretation leads to an important question: Is suicide bombing more often related 
or unrelated to non-suicide attacks in the same insurgency?  Theoretically, this is a question 
about the conditions that lead to patterns of suicide bombing that parallel non-suicide attacks, as 
opposed to conditions that lead to suicide attacks that do not parallel other attacks.  Are parallel 
declines only possible when the same intervention is suppressing all kinds of attacks, as was the 
case for Iraq 2007-2010?  Or are there conditions that will increase use of suicide bombers in 
parallel with increase in other forms of attack?   
Further research comparing suicide and non-suicide attacks in the same insurgency will 
be required to make progress on these questions.  We tend to think, however, that the synergistic 
combination of more and more locally deployed troops with a hiring program for insurgents was 
a product of unusual cultural and political conditions in Iraq.  In this regard we note that the 
same combination has not yet been successfully put to work in Afghanistan.   
 
Suicide bombers against Coalition Forces and International Civilians 
We believe that it will be surprising to many readers that attacks against Coalition and 
International targets amounted to only 13 percent of all suicide bomber attacks in Iraq between 
2003 and 2010.  Although suicide attacks against Coalition Forces began in the spring of 2003, 
suicide bombers against Coalition targets peaked in April, May, and June of 2005, and remained 
high through October 2005 as coalition forces carried out major COIN operations in Baghdad 
and al-Anbar provinces, with many suicide attacks occurring in these two areas.  After October 
2005, bombers against foreign targets declined and remained very low, as suicide bombers 
shifted to targeting almost exclusively Iraqis.  Even after the 2007 U.S. troop surge, when more 
than 20,000 additional U.S. soldiers were deployed to Iraq, suicide bombers did not increase 
against Coalition targets.   
Targeting patterns similar to those we report from tracking suicide bombers were 
reported in a study tracking fatalities from suicide bombings in Iraq 2003-2010.  Far more 
civilians died as a result of suicide attacks than coalition forces, and coalition forces suffered a 
sharp spike in fatalities in late 2003 and late 2004 to early 2005.  Civilians suffered peaks of 
fatalities in 2005 and 2007.26   
An explanation for the low numbers of bombers targeting coalition forces after October 
2005 may be the cost-benefit analysis of suicide operations against these high-value targets.  
Insurgent groups likely recognized the high risk of failure in targeting well-armed and trained 
coalition forces and heavily secured international civilians.  For insurgents, an attractive 
characteristic of suicide attacks is the tactic’s high kill-ratio (target deaths divided by bomber 
deaths), which is easier to obtain when detonating in a crowded marketplace filled with 
unprotected Iraqi civilians than when attempting to breach a heavily fortified compound.   
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Another reason that insurgents shifted their bombers away from foreign targets may be a 
change in perception of the threat facing the insurgents.  At the start of the insurgency, the most 
obvious threat to the existence of these insurgent groups was the presence of foreign occupying 
forces.  Later on in the insurgency, however, the forces with the greatest potential to weaken or 
eliminate insurgents were Iraqi forces.  When well-organized and well-led, local forces with 
local knowledge are likely to be perceived as a greater threat to insurgents than foreign forces.  
Especially would this be true to the extent that early attacks on coalition forces, including suicide 
attacks, put coalition forces in defensive positions where barricades separated them from the 
local population they were supposed to secure and win over.     
Theoretically, the relatively small proportion of suicide bombers attacking Coalition and 
International targets offers a warning against too-literal interpretation of suicide bombers as 
“smart bombs.”  Real smart bombs—including drone attacks—are usually sent against the most 
inaccessible, difficult, or hardened targets.  The too-easy implication of seeing suicide bombers 
as “smart bombs” is that insurgents will send their best weapon against the most difficult or 
hardened targets.  In Iraq, the contrary is observed: the great majority of suicide bombers were 
sent against other Iraqis rather than against better-defended Coalition or International targets.  
Similarly, Robert Pape’s thesis that suicide bombings are an extreme nationalist struggle 
against a foreign occupier is challenged by our results showing that far more suicide attacks 
occurred against Iraqis, especially Iraqi civilians, than occurred against foreigners.  In fact, 
suicide bombers began to be dispatched in significant numbers after sovereignty was handed 
over to the interim Iraqi government in June, 2004.  Although later attacks against the 
Awakening Movement might be rationalized as targeting perceived “collaborators” with the 
occupying forces, merely broadening the definition of an “occupying force” fails to take into 
account the change in strategy and political motivation behind these actions.   
 
Conclusion 
In this study, we disaggregated suicide bombers in Iraq by target, and tracked monthly variation 
in bombers.  Results offer some interesting implications for understanding the use of suicide 
attacks.       
First, monthly suicide bombers in Iraq showed a different pattern than non-suicide attacks 
between 2003 and 2006, but a similar pattern between 2007 and 2010.  We have suggested that 
understanding when these patterns are similar and when different is a project for future research.  
When the patterns are similar there is no need for separate analysis of suicide attacks, rather 
these attacks are then just one more violent tactic in a general trend of insurgent violence. 
Second, suicide bombers in Iraq were sent predominantly against soft Iraqi targets rather 
than against harder Coalition and International targets.  “Smart bombs” are not like hi-tech 
munitions in that they are not reserved for more difficult targets, nor are smart bombs focused 
particularly on foreign invaders, as Pape has suggested.27 
Third, only about 20 percent of suicide bombers were claimed by an insurgent group.  
Data regarding claims are likely incomplete, but it is clear that the great majority of suicide 
bombers were not claimed.  The preponderance of unclaimed bombers is a challenge to Bloom’s 
suggestion that suicide attacks are a form of competition for status (“outbidding”); unclaimed 
attacks cannot do much to raise a group’s public image. 28  Perhaps only Al Qaeda in Iraq, and 
other Al Qaeda-related groups, show signs of an “outbidding” strategy, given that nearly 90 
percent of all suicide bombers claimed were claimed by these groups.    
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In general, our results are consistent with Hafez’s suggestion that suicide attacks are the 
desperate means by which small groups tried to affect political events in Iraq.  Our data show 
first a 2005 peak in suicide attacks on both foreigners and Iraqis, as coalition forces attempt to 
build a democratic government dominated by Shi’ites.  Then we see a 2007 peak in attacks on 
Iraqis in response to the threat of a U.S. troop surge combined with U.S. purchase of Sunni 
fighters in the Awakening Movement.  By this time the more immediate threat to AQI and other 
small insurgent groups was a more effective counterinsurgency conducted by both Iraqi 
government forces and Awakening forces.  Finally in 2008, we see a peak in attacks on 
Awakening forces and leaders, a testimony to the special threat posed to AQI and other small 
Sunni insurgent groups by a counterinsurgency conducted by Sunni tribesmen.  Overall, the 
peaks in bombers sent against different targets are consistent with a changing threat assessment 
by small Sunni insurgent groups, with shifts in targeting related to where the greatest threat was 
perceived. 
In a larger perspective, suicide bombing campaigns have occurred in many countries 
since the invention of dynamite in the 1860s.  Rather than looking to extremist Islamist ideology 
or nationalist outrage against foreign occupiers to explain suicide bombing, it may be more 
useful to identify the targets of such campaigns and the circumstances within which these targets 
are attacked.  The goal is to understand suicide bombing as a tactic governed by an evolving 
strategy in relation to perceived threat, a perspective that can complement research on the 
psychology and sociology of martyrdom and the complex motivations for suicide bombers.  
 As we revise this paper in January 2013, Iraq is suffering the outbreak of politically 
motivated violence after the departure of the last coalition combat troops.  Dozens of suicide 
bombers have already made headlines, targeting mainly Iraqi civilians and Iraqi Security Forces.  
Speculation of Al Qaeda’s resurgence in Iraq abounds, and the group is increasingly claiming 
responsibility for strings of suicide and non-suicide attacks.  Equally disturbing, the tactic seems 
to have moved next door to Syria, where transnational insurgents may have been responsible for 
the suicide attacks claimed by the opposition group al-Nusrah Front, designated as a terrorist 
group by the United States in December 2012. . Suicide bombers are also at work in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan.  We expect that attention to targets and change in targets over time will be useful 
in understanding these and other campaigns of suicide bombing. 
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